Update on the Israel-Gaza Conflict from Stratfor

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Summary

Uriel Sinai/Getty Images

An Israeli rocket fired from the Iron Dome in Tel Aviv on  Nov. 17

New intelligence indicates forces in Gaza may be manufacturing long-range  rockets locally. If this is the case, a significant ground force offers the  Israelis the best chance of finding and neutralizing the factories making these  weapons. Meanwhile, Israel continues its airstrikes on Gaza, and Gaza  continues its long-range rocket attacks on major Israeli population centers,  though Israel claims its Iron Dome defense system has intercepted most of the  rockets.

Analysis

Israel appears to be positioning itself for a ground operation, perhaps as  early as the night of Nov. 17. The Israeli Cabinet on Nov. 16 approved Defense  Minister Ehud Barak’s request to call up 75,000 reservists, significantly more  than during Operation Cast  Lead in 2008-2009. The Israeli army meanwhile has also sought to strengthen  its presence on the borders with Gaza. Primary roads leading to Gaza and running  parallel to Sinai have been declared closed military zones. Tanks, armored  personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery and troops continue to stream to  the border, and many units already appear to be in position.

During Operation Cast Lead, the Israelis transitioned to the ground phase  around 8:00 p.m. on Jan. 3, 2009. Going in during dark hours allows the IDF to  take advantage of its superior night-fighting equipment and training, including  the use of night vision goggles and thermal optics.

The Israeli air force remained active throughout the night of Nov. 16-17,  striking at targets across the Gaza Strip including key Hamas ministries, police  stations and tunnels near the border crossing with Egypt. The IAF reportedly  carried out strikes in Rafah’s al-Sulan and al-Zahour neighborhoods, as well as  east of the al-Maghazi refugee camp. According to IDF reports, the air force  carried out a rapid and coordinated military strike, targeting approximately 70  underground medium-range rocket-launching sites in the less than an hour. The  IDF claims direct hits were confirmed. The IAF will increasingly target Hamas  militant defenses ahead of any ground invasion. Already the IAF has bombed  militant defensive positions, particularly in the northern part of the Gaza  Strip.

Meanwhile, Hamas and other militant factions in Gaza have been actively  striking back at Israel. More than 80 rockets have been launched from Gaza over  the past 24 hours. Of the rockets launched Nov. 17, approximately 57 landed in  Israel. According to the IDF, a total of 640 rockets have been launched since  Nov. 14, with 410 landing in Israel. A long-range rocket was fired from Gaza  toward Tel Aviv at approximately 4:45 p.m. local time Nov. 17 but was  successfully intercepted by the recently deployed Iron Dome anti-rocket defense  system in the area. Hamas continues to target areas around Ashkelon, Ashdod and  Beersheva, with the Iron Dome system intercepting five rockets over Ashkelon at  5:15 p.m. The majority of rockets launched from Gaza appear to be of shorter  range than the Fajr-5. The IDF has stated its Iron Dome interceptors have so far  successfully intercepted 90 percent of the rockets, though this may be an  exaggeration.

One of the long-range rockets was intercepted by the newly installed Iron  Dome battery in the Tel Aviv area. A Stratfor source has indicated that the  rocket was not a Fajr-5, but was a locally manufactured long-range rocket in  Hamas’ arsenal.

If militants in Gaza are now able to locally manufacture their own long-range  rockets that can target Tel Aviv and other major Israeli cities, it would be a  worrisome development for Israel. Thus far, Israel has been able to focus its  efforts on limiting the supply of these rockets to Gaza through interdiction  efforts, such as the alleged Oct.  23 strike on the Yarmouk arms factory in Sudan. But if Palestinian militants  can manufacture long-range rockets in Gaza, it will be much more difficult for  Israel to restrict Gaza’s inventory of these rockets. Beyond rocket launch  sites and caches, which Israel is currently targeting with its airstrikes, it  would need to target production sites and those who would be responsible for  manufacturing the rockets.

Furthermore, it will be significantly harder for Israeli intelligence to form  an accurate picture of the number of these rockets locally constructed in Gaza.  We have already seen that Israeli intelligence likely did not anticipate how many long-range rockets had  escaped its first wave of strikes, and the fact that Hamas may have been  producing these weapons could explain Israel’s lack of complete information.

Hamas recognizes that these long-range rocket attacks have only increased the  likelihood and intensity of an Israeli ground incursion. A significant ground  force offers the Israelis the best chance of finding and neutralizing the  factories making these long-range rockets as well as the shorter-range Qassams.  Hamas and the other militants therefore are actively preparing their defenses  for the anticipated incursion and are likely laying improvised explosive  devices, setting up road blocks and defensive emplacements and sorting out their  ranks and tasks.

Hamas has already announced that its Al Murabiteen units, consisting of five  brigades spread across Gaza, will be concentrated in the border region to limit  Israeli penetration into the Gaza Strip. Learning from Hezbollah’s example in  2006, special units of Hamas are relying heavily on tunnels to maintain  communications. Should Israel be drawn into more densely populated areas of Gaza  in pursuit of weapons storage and manufacturing facilities, Hamas has also  reportedly prepared its suicide bombers, known as Istishadiyeen, to raise the  cost for Israel in an urban battle.

Read more:  Update on the Israel-Gaza Conflict | Stratfor