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Avoiding the Wars That Never End

Republished from Stratfor.

Avoiding the  Wars That Never End is republished with permission of Stratfor.”

Read more:  Avoiding the Wars That Never End | Stratfor

By George Friedman Founder  and Chief Executive Officer, Stratfor.

Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that the United States would  transfer the primary responsibility for combat operations in Afghanistan to the  Afghan military in the coming months, a major step toward the withdrawal of U.S.  forces. Also last week, France began an  intervention in Mali designed to block jihadists from taking control of the  country and creating a base of operations in France’s former African  colonies.

The two events are linked in a way that transcends the issue of Islamist  insurgency and points to a larger geopolitical shift. The United States is not  just drawing down its combat commitments; it is moving  away from the view that it has the primary responsibility for trying to  manage the world on behalf of itself, the Europeans and its other allies.  Instead, that burden is shifting to those who have immediate interests  involved.

Insecurity in 9/11’s Wake

It is interesting to recall how the United States involved itself in  Afghanistan. After 9/11, the United States was in shock and lacked clear  intelligence on al Qaeda. It did not know what additional capabilities al Qaeda  had or what the group’s intentions were. Lacking intelligence, a political  leader has the obligation to act on worst-case scenarios after the enemy has  demonstrated hostile intentions and capabilities. The possible scenarios ranged  from additional sleeper cells operating and awaiting orders in the United States  to al Qaeda having obtained nuclear weapons to destroy cities. When you don’t  know, it is both prudent and psychologically inevitable to plan for the  worst.

The United States had sufficient information to act in Afghanistan. It knew  that al Qaeda was operating in Afghanistan and that disrupting the main cell was  a useful step in taking some action against the threat. However, the United  States did not immediately invade Afghanistan. It bombed the country extensively  and inserted limited forces on the ground, but the primary burden of fighting  the Taliban government was in the hands of anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan  that had been resisting the Taliban and in the hands of other forces that could  be induced to act against the Taliban. The Taliban gave up the cities and  prepared for a long war. Al Qaeda’s command cell left Afghanistan and shifted to  Pakistan.

The United States achieved its primary goal early on. That goal was not to  deny al Qaeda the ability to operate in Afghanistan, an objective that would  achieve nothing. Rather, the goal was to engage al Qaeda and disrupt its  command-and-control structure as a way to degrade the group’s ability to plan  and execute additional attacks. The move  to Pakistan at the very least bought time, and given continued pressure on  the main cell, allowed the United States to gather more intelligence about al  Qaeda assets around the world.

This second mission — to identify al Qaeda assets around the world —  required a second effort. The primary means of identifying them was through  their electronic communications, and the United States proceeded to create a  vast technological mechanism designed to detect communications and use that  detection to identify and capture or kill al Qaeda operatives. The problem with  this technique — really the only one available — was that it was impossible to  monitor al Qaeda’s communications without monitoring everyone’s. If there was a  needle in the haystack, the entire haystack had to be examined. This was a  radical shift in the government’s relationship to the private communications of  citizens. The justification was that at a time of war, in which the threat to  the United States was uncertain and possibly massive, these measures were  necessary.

This action was not unique in American history. Abraham Lincoln violated the  Constitution in several ways during the Civil War, from suspending the right to  habeas corpus to blocking the Maryland Legislature from voting on a secession  measure. Franklin Roosevelt allowed the FBI to open citizens’ mail and put  Japanese-Americans into internment camps. The idea that civil liberties must be  protected in time of war is not historically how the United States, or most  countries, operate. In that sense there was nothing unique in the decision to  monitor communications in order to find al Qaeda and stop attacks. How else  could the needle be found in the haystack? Likewise, detention without trial was  not unique. Lincoln and Roosevelt both resorted to it.

The Civil War and World War II were different from the current conflict,  however, because their conclusions were clear and decisive. The wars would end,  one way or another, and so would the suspension of rights. Unlike those wars,  the war in Afghanistan was extended indefinitely by the shift in strategy from  disrupting al Qaeda’s command cell to fighting  the Taliban to building a democratic society in Afghanistan. With the second  step, the U.S. military mission changed its focus and increased its presence  massively, and with the third, the terminal date of the war became very far  away.

But there was a broader issue. The war in Afghanistan was not the main war.  Afghanistan happened to be the place where al Qaeda was headquartered on Sept.  11, 2001. The country was not essential to al Qaeda, and creating a democratic  society there — if it were even possible — would not necessarily weaken al  Qaeda. Even destroying al Qaeda would not prevent new  Islamist organizations or individuals from rising up.

A New Kind of War

The main war was not against one specific terrorist group, but rather against  an idea: the radical tendency in Islamism. Most Muslims are not radicals, but  any religion with 1 billion adherents will have its share of extremists. The  tendency is there, and it is deeply rooted. If the goal of the war were the  destruction of this radical tendency, then it was not going to happen. While the  risk of attacks could be reduced — and indeed there were no further 9/11s  despite repeated attempts in the United States — there was no way to eliminate  the threat. No matter how many divisions were deployed, no matter how many  systems for electronic detection were created, they could only mitigate the  threat, not eliminate it. Therefore, what some  called the Long War really became permanent war.

The means by which the war was pursued could not result in victory. They  could, however, completely unbalance U.S. strategy by committing massive  resources to missions not clearly connected with preventing Islamist terrorism.  It also created a situation where emergency intrusions on critical portions of  the Bill of Rights — such as the need to obtain a warrant for certain actions  — became a permanent feature. Permanent war makes for permanent temporary  measures.

The break point came, in my opinion, in about 2004. Around that time, al  Qaeda was unable to mount attacks on the United States despite multiple efforts.  The war in Afghanistan had dislodged al Qaeda and created the Karzai government.  The invasion of Iraq — whatever the rationale might have been — clearly  produced a level of resistance that the United States could not contain or could  contain only by making agreements with its enemies in Iraq. At that point, a  radical rethinking of the war had to take place. It did not.

The radical rethinking had to do not with Iraq or Afghanistan, but rather  with what to do about a permanent threat to the United States, and indeed to  many other countries, posed by the global networks of radical Islamists prepared  to carry out terrorist attacks. The threat would not go away, and it could not  be eliminated. At the same time, it did  not threaten the existence of the republic. The 9/11 attacks were atrocious,  but they did not threaten the survival of the United States in spite of the  human cost. Combating the threat required a degree of proportionality so the  fight could be maintained on an ongoing basis, without becoming the only goal of  U.S. foreign policy or domestic life. Mitigation was the only possibility; the  threat would have to be endured.

Washington found a way to achieve this balance in the past, albeit against  very different sorts of threats. The United States emerged as a great power in  the early 20th century. During that time, it fought three wars: World War I,  World War II and the Cold War, which included Korea, Vietnam and other, smaller  engagements. In World War I and World War II, the United States waited for  events to unfold, and in Europe in particular it waited until the European  powers reached a point where they could not deal with the threat of German  hegemony without American intervention. In both instances, it intervened heavily  only late in the war, at the point where the Germans had been exhausted by other  European powers. It should be remembered that the main American push in World  War II did not take place until the summer of 1944. The American strategy was to  wait and see whether the Europeans could stabilize the situation themselves,  using distance to mobilize as late as possible and intervene decisively only at  the critical moment.

The critics of this approach, particularly prior to World War II, called it  isolationism. But the United States was not isolationist; it was involved in  Asia throughout this period. Rather, it saw itself as being the actor of last  resort, capable of acting at the decisive moment with overwhelming force because  geography had given the United States the option of time and resources.

During the Cold War, the United States modified this strategy. It still  depended on allies, but it now saw itself as the first responder. Partly this  could be seen in U.S. nuclear strategy. This could also be seen in Korea and  Vietnam, where allies played subsidiary roles, but the primary effort was  American. The Cold War was fought on a different set of principles than the two  world wars.

The Cold War strategy was applied to the war against radical Islamism, in  which the United States — because of 9/11 but also because of a mindset that  could be seen in other interventions — was the first responder. Other allies  followed the United States’ lead and provided support to the degree to which  they felt comfortable. The allies could withdraw without fundamentally  undermining the war effort. The United States could not.

The approach in the U.S.-jihadist war was a complete reversal from the  approach taken in the two world wars. This was understandable given that it was  triggered by an unexpected and catastrophic event, the reponse to which flowed  from a lack of intelligence. When Japan struck Pearl Harbor, emotions were  at least as intense, but U.S. strategy in the Pacific was measured and cautious.  And the enemy’s capabilities were much better understood.

Stepping Back as Global Policeman

The United States cannot fight a war against radical Islamism and win, and it  certainly cannot be the sole actor in a war waged primarily in the Eastern  Hemisphere. This is why the French  intervention in Mali is particularly interesting. France retains interests  in its former colonial empire in Africa, and Mali is at the geographic center of  these interests. To the north of Mali is Algeria, where France has significant  energy investments; to the east of Mali is Niger, where France has a significant  stake in the mining of mineral resources, particularly uranium; and to the south  of Mali is Ivory Coast, where France plays a major role in cocoa production. The  future of Mali matters to France far more than it matters to the United  States.

What is most interesting is the absence of the United States in the fight,  even if it is providing intelligence and other support, such as mobilizing  ground forces from other African countries. The United States is not acting as  if this is its fight; it is acting as if this is the fight of an ally, whom it  might help in extremis, but not in a time when U.S. assistance is  unnecessary. And if the French can’t mount an effective operation in Mali,  then little help can be given.

This changing approach is also evident in Syria, where the United States has  systematically avoided anything beyond limited  and covert assistance, and Libya, where the United States intervened after  the French and British launched an attack they could not sustain. That was, I  believe, a turning point, given the unsatisfactory outcome there. Rather than  accepting a broad commitment against radical Islamism everywhere, the United  States is allowing the burden to shift to powers that have direct interests in  these areas.

Reversing a strategy is difficult. It is uncomfortable for any power to  acknowledge that it has overreached, which the United States did both in Iraq  and Afghanistan. It is even more difficult to acknowledge that the goals set by  President George W. Bush in Iraq and Obama in Afghanistan lacked coherence. But  clearly the war has run its course, and what is difficult is also obvious. We  are not going to eliminate the threat of radical Islamism. The commitment of  force to an unattainable goal twists national strategy out of shape and changes  the fabric of domestic life. Obviously, overwatch must be in place against the  emergence of an organization like al Qaeda, with global reach, sophisticated  operatives and operational discipline. But this is very different from  responding to jihadists in Mali, where the United States has limited interests  and fewer resources.

Accepting an ongoing  threat is also difficult. Mitigating the threat of an enemy rather than  defeating the enemy outright goes against an impulse. But it is not  something alien to American strategy. The United States is involved in the  world, and it can’t follow the founders’ dictum of staying out of European  struggles. But the United States has the option of following U.S. strategy in  the two world wars. The United States was patient, accepted risks and  shifted the burden to others, and when it acted, it acted out of necessity, with  clearly defined goals matched by capabilities. Waiting until there is no  choice but to go to war is not isolationism. Allowing others to carry the  primary risk is not disengagement. Waging wars that are finite is not  irresponsible.

The greatest danger of war is what it can do to one’s own society, changing  the obligations of citizens and reshaping their rights. The United States has  always done this during wars, but those wars would always end. Fighting a war  that cannot end reshapes domestic life permanently. A strategy that compels  engagement everywhere will exhaust a country. No empire can survive the  imperative of permanent, unwinnable warfare. It is fascinating to watch the  French deal with Mali. It is even more fascinating to watch the United States  wishing them well and mostly staying out of it. It has taken about 10 years, but  here we can see the American system stabilize itself by mitigating the threats  that can’t be eliminated and refusing to be drawn into fights it can let others  handle.

Read more:  Avoiding the Wars That Never End | Stratfor

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In Pakistan, Mixed Results from a Peshawar Attack from Stratfor

In  Pakistan, Mixed Results From a Peshawar Attack is republished with  permission of Stratfor.”

By Ben West

The Pakistani  Taliban continue to undermine Pakistan’s government and military  establishment, and in doing so, they continue to raise questions over the  security of the country’s nuclear arsenal. On Dec. 15, 10 militants armed with  suicide vests and grenades attacked Peshawar Air Force Base, the site of a third  major operation by the Pakistani Taliban since May 2011. Tactically, the attack  was relatively unsuccessful — all the militants were killed, and the perimeter  of the air base was not breached — but the Pakistani Taliban nonetheless  achieved their objective.

The attack began the night of Dec. 15 with a volley of three to five mortar  shells. As the shells were fired, militants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised  explosive device near the perimeter wall of the air base. Reports indicate that  all five militants inside the vehicle were killed. The other five militants  engaged security forces in a nearby residential area and eventually were driven  back before they could enter the air base. The next day, security forces acting  on a report of suspicious activity confronted the militants, who all died in the  resultant shootout.

Pakistani security forces came away from the incident looking very good. They  prevented a large and seemingly coordinated team of militants from entering the  confines of the base and thus from damaging civilian and military aircraft. Some  of Pakistan’s newly  acquired Chinese-Pakistani made JF-17s, are stationed at the air base, and  worth roughly $20 million each, they were probably the militants ultimate  targets.

Another reason the militants may have chosen the base is its location.  Peshawar Air Force Base is the closest base to the northwest tribal areas of  Pakistan, where Pakistani and U.S. forces are clashing with Taliban militants  who threaten Islamabad and Kabul. The air base is most likely a hub for  Pakistan’s air operations against those militants. The Dec. 15 attack killed one  police officer and a few other civilians, but it did no damage to the air base,  the adjacent civilian airport or their respective aircraft. Flights were  postponed for only a couple of hours as security forces cleared the area.

Tactics and Previous Attacks

Major military bases in Pakistan have been attacked before. In May 2011,  Pakistani Taliban militants armed with rocket-propelled grenades and firearms  destroyed two  P-3C maritime surveillance aircraft and killed 10 soldiers during an  attack on Mehran  Naval Air Base in Karachi. The militants entered the base by cutting through  the fence.

More recently, seven Pakistani Taliban militants scaled the walls of Minhas  Air Force Base in Kamra before killing a soldier and damaging a  Ukrainian transport aircraft. They were pushed back before they could damage the  squadron of F-16 fighter aircraft stationed at the base.

The Dec. 15 attack was not nearly as destructive as these other attacks,  probably because half the militants were killed immediately in the explosion at  the perimeter. Their deaths suggest the device detonated earlier than expected  or that they were not far enough from the device when it exploded. It is unclear  why they died, but the device could have detonated prematurely for several  reasons. There could have been a glitch in the construction or detonation  of the device. Otherwise, it could have been the result of the security  forces’ countermeasures (something officials have not yet claimed). Had the  militants survived the explosion and breached the perimeter, they might have  been more successful against security.

The Dec. 15 attack also differs from the previous two attacks tactically.  Whereas militants stealthily entered the bases in Kamra and Karachi, the  militants who attacked the base in Peshawar used mortars and explosives because  the wall — roughly eight feet high and topped with barbed wire — could not be  cut or climbed easily. These tactics are much more aggressive than the two  previous air base attacks, and therefore they immediately caught the attention  of security forces. Indeed, security forces in the vicinity would have heard  mortar shells and explosions. But just as important, mortar shells and  explosions create flames that security forces can use to pinpoint the attack and  respond quickly.

It is hard to say whether the combination and coordination of mortar fire,  explosives and a direct ground assault with firearms would have resulted in a  successful attack even if half the militants had not died in the initial  explosion. They certainly would have been greatly outnumbered. The few mortar  shells fired at the base may have suppressed forces momentarily, but the  militants did not sustain their indirect cover fire, which eventually allowed  security forces more mobility in responding. In any case, breaching the wall  with an explosion sacrifices the element of surprise too early — outside the  base rather than inside — reducing the amount of time the assailants have to  find their targets before security could respond.

A final reason the attack failed may have been the fact that the threat was  known about weeks earlier. In late November, authorities apprehended a would-be  suicide bomber and his handler entering Peshawar on a motorcycle. The suspect  later confessed that they were targeting the airport. Peshawar airport was  already on high alert after the attack on the Kamra base in August. The November  arrests heightened security, which lessened the militants’ chance of surprise.  Moreover, the arrests were made publicly available in open-source materials, so  the militants should have known that security forces were on high alert.

As for the security forces, the protective  intelligence available was obvious, and the attack came when they were  most prepared to repel it. Yet they benefited greatly when the explosion did  half their work for them. It appears that they just got lucky.

Strategic Value

The Dec. 15 attack appears to have been carried out by militants who intended  to replicate the damage caused by their comrades’ attacks in Karachi and Kamra.  Tactically, they failed.

But that does not mean the operation wasn’t valuable. Like previous attacks  on Pakistani military installations, the Peshawar attack grabs headlines because  of its high profile. Put simply, the sensitivity of the target demands media  attention.

As in the Karachi and Kamra attacks, the Dec. 15 attack involves the security  of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. There are no indications that there are nuclear  weapons stored at the Peshawar base, and there is no evidence that the nuclear  weapons that may have been stored at the Karachi and Kamra bases were  compromised. But the attack nonetheless raises questions about the security of  Pakistan’s military installations and by extension their nuclear  arsenal. For the United States and India, such attacks compel lawmakers to  revisit debates over whether the United States should intervene to protect the  weapons.

These headlines and discussions benefit the Pakistani Taliban because they  call into question Islamabad’s ability to rule. Meanwhile, the Pakistani Taliban  will continue to try to destabilize the military, one of the strongest pillars  of the state, and provoke  fear of external involvement from the United States.

In fact, the Pakistani Taliban would benefit from U.S. involvement, which  would create huge public backlash and chaotic conditions in which the militants  could thrive. The Pakistani Taliban do not necessarily need to destroy aircraft  or kill military personnel to raise these doubts in Pakistan and the wider  world. From the perspective of the insurgents, all the coordination and  firepower they brought to the attack was a strategic success if this attack  nurtures that doubt, even if it wasn’t as tactically successful as previous  attacks.

Read more:  In Pakistan, Mixed Results From a Peshawar Attack | Stratfor

 

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