Monthly Archives: December 2012

Al Assad’s Last Stand from Stratfor

Al Assad’s Last Stand is republished with permission of Stratfor.”

By Omar Lamrani

The battle for Damascus is raging with increasing intensity while rebels  continue to make substantial advances in Syria’s north and east. Every new  air base, city or town that falls to the rebels further underlines that Bashar  al Assad’s writ over the country is shrinking. It is no longer possible to  accurately depict al Assad as the ruler of Syria. At this point, he is merely  the head of a  large and powerful armed force, albeit one that still controls a significant  portion of the country.

The nature of the conflict has changed significantly since it began nearly  two years ago. The rebels initially operated with meager resources and  equipment, but bolstered by defections, some outside support and their demographic advantage, they have  managed to gain ground on what was previously a far superior enemy. Even  the regime’s qualitative superiority in equipment is fast eroding as the rebels  start to frequently utilize main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles,  rocket and tube artillery and even man-portable  air-defense systems captured from the regime’s stockpiles.

Weary and stumbling, the regime is attempting to push back rebel forces in  and near Damascus and to maintain a corridor to the Alawite coast while delaying  rebel advances in the rest of the country. Al Assad and his allies will fight  for every inch, fully aware that their power depends on the ability of  the regime forces to hold ground.

The Battle for Damascus

Visit our Syria  page for related analysis, videos, situation reports and maps.

It is important to remember that, despite considerable setbacks, al Assad’s  forces still control a sizable portion of Syria and its population centers.  After failing to take Damascus in Operation Damascus Volcano in July, the rebels  are again stepping up their efforts and operations in the Damascus area.  However, unlike in their previous failed operation, this time the rebels are  relying on an intensive guerrilla campaign to exhaust and degrade al  Assad’s substantial forces in Damascus and its countryside.

After the last surge in fighting around Damascus in July and August, the  regime kept large numbers of troops in the area. These forces continued search  and destroy operations near the capital despite the considerable pressure facing  its forces in the rest of the country, including in Aleppo. Once the rebels  began to make gains in the north and east, the regime was forced to dispatch  some of its forces around Damascus to reinforce other fronts. Unfortunately  for the regime, its operations in the capital area had not significantly  degraded local rebel forces. Rebels in the area began intensifying their  operations once more, forcing the regime to recall many of its units to  Damascus.

Aware of the magnitude of the threat, the regime has reportedly shifted its  strategy in the battle for Damascus to isolating the city proper from the  numerous suburbs. The rebels have made considerable headway in the Damascus  suburbs. For example, on Nov. 25 rebels overran the Marj al-Sultan  military air base in eastern Ghouta, east of the capital. Rebel operations in  the outskirts of Damascus have also interrupted the flow of goods to and from  the city, causing the prices of basic staples such as bread to skyrocket.

Rebel Gains in the East and North

Damascus is not the only area where the regime is finding itself under  considerable pressure. The rebels have made some major advances in the last  month in the energy-rich Deir el-Zour governorate to the east. Having  seized a number of towns, airfields and military bases, the rebels have also  taken the majority of the oil fields in the governorate. They captured the  Al-Ward oil field Nov. 4, the Conoco natural gas reserve Nov.  27 and, after al Assad’s forces withdrew from it on Nov. 29, the Omar  oil field north of the town of Mayadeen. Al Assad’s forces now control only five  oil fields, all located west of the city of Deir el-Zour. With the battle for  the city and its associated airfield intensifying, even those remaining fields  are at risk of falling into rebel hands.

The rebel successes in Deir el-Zour have effectively cut the regime’s ground  lines of communication and supply to Iraq. They have also starved the regime of  the vast majority of its oil revenue and affected its ability to fuel its war  machine. At the same time, the rebels are reportedly already seeking to  capitalize on their seizure of the eastern oil fields. According  to reports, the rebels are smuggling oil to Turkey and Iraq and using the  revenue to purchase arms. They are also reportedly using the oil and  natural gas locally for power generators and fuel.

While all of eastern Syria may soon fall into rebel hands, rebels in the  north have continued to isolate al Assad forces in Idlib and Aleppo  governorates, particularly in the capital cities of those two provinces. After  overrunning the 46th regiment near Atarib on Nov. 19 following a  two-month siege, the rebels are now looking to further squeeze remaining regime  forces in Aleppo by taking the Sheikh Suleiman base north of the  46th regiment’s former base.

The Rebels’ Improved Air Defense Capability

Isolated and surrounded, regime  forces in the north are increasingly relying on air support for both defense  and supply. However, this advantage is deteriorating every day and is  increasingly threatened by the rebels’ improved air defense arsenal and  tactics.

The rebels first attempted to acquire air defense weaponry by seizing heavy  machine guns and anti-aircraft artillery. They captured a number of air defense  bases, taking 12.7 mm DShK heavy machine guns, 14.5 mm KPV heavy machine guns  and even 23 mm ZU-23-2 autocannons. Over time, the rebels became more proficient  with these weapons, and an increasing number of Syrian air force fixed-wing and  rotary aircraft were shot down. The rebels also formed hunter-killer groups with  air defense equipment mounted on flatbed trucks that provided them mobile  platforms for targeting regime air and infantry units.

As more and more regime bases were taken, the rebels were able to bolster  their air defense equipment through the capture of a number of man-portable  air-defense systems. At the outset of the conflict, the Syrian military  maintained a large inventory of shoulder-fired air-defense missiles, likely  thousands of missiles ranging from early generation SA-7s to very advanced  SA-24s. These missiles were stored in army bases across the country. There are  also unconfirmed reports that Qatar and Saudi Arabia may have transferred some  man-portable air-defense systems to the rebels through Turkey.

The rebels tallied their first confirmed kill with shoulder-fired air-defense  missiles Nov. 27, when they shot down a Syrian Arab Air Force  Mi-8/17 helicopter near Aleppo city. The weapon system used in the  attack was likely an SA-7, SA-16 or SA-24 captured from the 46th regiment.  The surface-to-air missiles are a serious upgrade in the rebels’ air  defense capability.

The Fight Continues

Having isolated al Assad’s  forces in the north and made substantial advances in the east, the  rebels are poised to push farther into the Orontes River Valley to relieve the  beleaguered rebel units in the Rastan, Homs and al-Qusayr areas of Homs  governorate. For months, regime forces have sought to overwhelm the remaining  rebel forces in Homs city, but the rebels have managed to hold out.  The rebels are also set to begin pushing south along the main M5 thoroughfare to  Khan Sheikhoun and the approaches to Hama. However, first they need to overwhelm  the remaining regime forces in Wadi al-Dhaif near Maarrat al-Numan.

Alternatively, the regime is fighting hard to maintain its control over the  Orontes River Valley around Homs in order to keep an open  corridor linking Damascus to the mostly Alawite coast. Not only is  this corridor at risk of eventually being cut off, but the regime is also facing  a substantial push by rebel forces into northeastern Latakia governorate from  Idlib. Rebels have advanced in the vicinity of the Turkman Mountain, have taken  control of Bdama and are now fighting their way down in the direction of Latakia  city.

While events in Damascus and Rif Damascus are increasingly worrisome for the  regime, al Assad’s forces in the rest of Syria are also under considerable  pressure from rebel advances. It is by no means certain that al Assad’s forces  are under imminent threat of collapse because they still hold a great deal of  territory and no major city has yet been completely taken by the rebels. The  retreat and consolidation of al Assad’s forces also allows them to maintain  shorter and less vulnerable lines of supply. However, it is clear that the  regime is very much on the defensive and has been forced to gradually contract  its lines toward a core that now encompasses Damascus, the Orontes River Valley  and the mostly Alawite coast. With the regime’s situation rapidly  deteriorating, even the attempt to stage a gradual withdrawal to the core is  risky.

Read more:  Al Assad’s Last Stand | Stratfor

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Egypt and the Strategic Balance from Stratfor

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“<a href=”http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/egypt-and-strategic-balance”>Egypt and the Strategic Balance</a> is republished with permission of Stratfor.”

By George Friedman Founder  and Chief Executive Officer

Immediately following the declaration of a cease-fire  in Gaza, Egypt was plunged into a massive domestic crisis. Mohammed Morsi,  elected in the first presidential election after the fall of Hosni  Mubarak, passed a decree that would essentially neuter  the independent judiciary by placing his executive powers above the high  court and proposed changes to the constitution that would institutionalize the  Muslim Brotherhood’s power. Following the decree, Morsi’s political opponents  launched massive demonstrations that threw Egypt into domestic instability and  uncertainty.

In the case of most countries, this would not be a matter of international  note. But Egypt  is not just another country. It is the largest Arab country and one that has  been the traditional center of the Arab world. Equally important, if Egypt’s  domestic changes translate into shifts in its foreign policy, it could affect  the regional balance of power for decades to come.

Morsi’s Challenge to the Nasserite Model

The Arab Spring was seen by some observers to be a largely secular movement  aimed at establishing constitutional democracy. The problem with this theory was  that while the demonstrators might have had the strength to force an election,  it was not certain that the secular constitutionalists would win it. They  didn’t. Morsi is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and while there were  numerous claims that he was a moderate member, it was simply not understood that  he was a man of conviction and honor and that his membership in the Brotherhood  was not casual or frivolous. His intention was to strengthen the role of Islam  in Egypt and the control of the Muslim Brotherhood over the various arms of  state. His rhetoric, speed and degree of Islamism might have been less extreme  than others, but his intent was clear.

The move on the judiciary signaled his intent to begin consolidating power.  It galvanized opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood, which included secular  constitutionalists, Copts and other groups who formed a coalition that was  prepared to take to the streets to oppose his move. What it did not include, or  at least did not visibly include through this point, was the Egyptian military,  which refused to  be drawn in on either side.

The Egyptian military, led by a young army officer named Gamal Abdel Nasser, founded the  modern Egyptian state when it overthrew the British-supported monarchy in  the 1950s. It created a state that was then secular, authoritarian and  socialist. It aligned Egypt with the Soviet Union and against the United States  through the 1970s. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Egyptian President Anwar  Sadat, who was later assassinated by Islamists, shifted Egypt into an alliance  with the United States and signed a peace treaty with Israel.

This treaty was the foundation of the regional balance of power until now.  The decision to end the state of war with Israel and use Sinai as a  demilitarized buffer between the two countries eliminated the threat of  nation-to-nation war between Arabs and Israel. Egypt was the most powerful Arab  country and its hostility to Israel represented Israel’s greatest threat. By  withdrawing from confrontation, the threat to Israel declined dramatically.  Jordan, Syria and Lebanon did not represent a significant threat to Israel and  could not launch a war that threatened Israel’s survival.

Egypt’s decision to align with the United States and make peace with Israel  shaped the regional balance of power in other ways. Syria could no longer depend  on Egypt, and ultimately turned to Iran for support. The Arab monarchies that  had been under political and at times military pressure from Egypt were relieved  of the threat, and the Soviets lost the Egyptian bases that had given them  a foothold in the Mediterranean.

The fundamental question in Egypt is whether the election of Morsi  represented the end of the regime founded by Nasser or was simply a passing  event, with power still in the hands of the military. Morsi has made a move  designed to demonstrate his power and to change the way the Egyptian judiciary  works. The uprising against this move, while significant, did not seem to have  the weight needed either to force Morsi to do more than modify his tactics a bit  or to threaten his government. Therefore, it all hangs on whether the military  is capable of or interested in intervening.

It is ironic that the demands of the liberals in Egypt should depend on  military intervention, and it is unlikely that they will get what they want from  the military if it does intervene. But what is clear is that the Muslim  Brotherhood is the dominant force in Egypt, that Morsi is very much a member of  the Brotherhood and while his tactics might be more deliberate and circumspect  than more radical members might want, it is still headed in the same  direction.

For the moment, the protesters in the streets do not appear able to force  Morsi’s hand, and the military doesn’t seem likely to intervene. If that is  true, then Egypt has entered a new domestic era with a range of open foreign  policy issues. The first is the future of the treaty with Israel. The issue is  not the treaty per se, but the maintenance of Sinai as a buffer. One of the  consequences of Mubarak’s ouster has been the partial  remilitarization of Sinai by Egypt, with Israel’s uneasy support. Sinai has  become a zone in which Islamist radicals are active and launch  operations against Israel. The Egyptian military has moved into Sinai to  suppress them, which Israel obviously supports. But the Egyptians have also  established the principle that while Sinai may be a notional buffer zone, in  practice the Egyptian military can be present in and responsible for it. The  intent might be one that Israel supports but the outcome could be a Sinai  remilitarized by the Egyptians.

A remilitarized Sinai would change the strategic balance, but it would only  be the beginning. The Egyptian army uses American equipment and depends on the  United States for spare parts, maintenance and training. Its equipment is  relatively old and it has not been tested in combat for nearly 40 years. Even if  the Egyptian military was in Sinai, it would not pose a significant conventional  military threat to Israel in its current form. These things can change, however.  The transformation of the Egyptian army between 1967 and 1973 was impressive.  The difference is that Egypt had a patron in the Soviet Union then that was  prepared to underwrite the cost of the transformation. Today, there is no global  power, except the United States, that would be capable of dramatically and  systematically upgrading the Egyptian military and financially supporting the  country overall. Still, if the Morsi government succeeds in institutionalizing  its power and uses that power to change the dynamic of the Sinai buffer, Israel  will lose several layers of security.

A New Regional Alignment?

A look at the rest of the region shows that Egypt is by no means the only  country of concern for Israel. Syria, for example, has an uprising that, in  simple terms, largely consists of Sunnis, many of which are Islamists.  That in itself represents a threat to Israel, particularly if the relationship  between Syria and Egypt were revived. There is an ideological kinship, and just  as Nasserism had an evangelical dimension, wanting to spread pan-Arab ideology  throughout the region, the Muslim Brotherhood has one too. The Syrian Muslim  Brotherhood is also the most organized and coherent opposition group in  Syria. As Morsi consolidates his power in Egypt, his willingness to engage  in foreign adventures, or at least covert support, for like-minded insurgents  and regimes could very well increase. At a minimum Israel would have to take  this seriously. Similarly, where Gaza  was contained not only by Israel but also by pre-Morsi Egypt, Morsi might  choose to dramatically change Egypt’s Gaza policy.

Morsi’s rise opens other possibilities as well. Turkey’s Islamic-rooted  Justice and Development Party is also engaged in a careful process of  reintroducing Islam into a state that was militantly secular. There are fundamental  differences between Egypt and Turkey, but there is also much in common.  Turkey and Egypt are now engaged in parallel processes designed to create modern  countries that recognize their Islamic roots. A Turkish-Egyptian relationship  would both undergird the Egyptian regime and create a regional force that could  shape the Eastern Mediterranean.

This would, of course, affect American strategy, which as  we have said in the past, is now rapidly moving away from excessive  involvement in the Middle East. It is not clear how far Morsi would go in  breaking with the United States or whether the military would or could draw a  line at that point. Egypt is barely  skirting economic disaster at the moment because it is receiving a broad  range of financial aid from the West. Moving away from the United States would  presumably go well beyond military aid and affect these other types of economic  assistance.

The fact is that as Egypt gradually evolves, its relationship with the United  States might also change. The United States’ relationship  with Turkey has changed but has not broken since the Justice and Development  Party came to power, with Turkey following a more independent direction. If a  similar process occurred in Egypt, the United States would find itself in a very  different position in the Eastern Mediterranean, one in which its only ally was  Israel, and its relationship with Israel might alienate the critical  Turkey-Egypt bloc.

Prior to 1967, the United States was careful not be become overly involved in  protecting Israel, leaving that to France. Assuming that this speculation about  a shift in Egypt’s strategic posture came to pass, Israel would not be in  serious military danger for quite a while, and the United States could view its  support to Israel as flexible. The United States could conceivably choose to  distance itself from Israel in order to maintain its relationships with Egypt  and Turkey. A strategy of selective disengagement and  redefined engagement, which appears to be under way in the United States now,  could alter relations with Israel.

From an Israeli point of view — it should be remembered that Israel is the  dominant power in the region — a shift in Egypt would create significant  uncertainty on its frontier. It would now face  uncertainty in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, and while unlikely, the possibility  of uncertainty in Jordan. Where previously it faced hostile powers with  substantial military capabilities, it would now face weaker powers that are  less predictable. However, in an age when Israel’s primary concern is with  terrorist actions and uprisings in Gaza and the West Bank, this band of  uncertainty would be an incubator of such actions.

The worst-case scenario is the re-emergence of confrontational states on its  border, armed with conventional weapons and capable of challenging the Israeli  military. That is not an inconceivable evolution but it is not a threat in the  near term. The next-worst-case scenario would be the creation of multiple states  on Israel’s border prepared to sponsor or at least tolerate Islamist attacks on  Israel from their territory and to underwrite uprisings among the Palestinians.  The effect would be an extended, wearying test of Israel’s ability to deal with  unremitting low-intensity threats from multiple directions.

Conventional war is hard to imagine. It is less difficult to imagine a shift  in Egyptian policy that creates a sustained low-intensity conflict not only  south of Israel, but also along the entire Israeli periphery as Egypt’s  influence is felt. It is fairly clear that Israel has not absorbed the  significance of this change or how it will respond. It may well not have a  response. But if that were the case, then Israel’s conventional dominance would  no longer define the balance of power. And the United States is entering a  period of unpredictability in its foreign policy. The entire region becomes  unpredictable.

It is not clear that any of this will come to pass. Morsi might not be able  to impose his will in the country. He may not survive politically. The Egyptian  military might intervene directly or indirectly. There are several hurdles for  Morsi to overcome before he controls the country, and his timeline might be  extended for implementing changes. But for the moment, Morsi appears in charge,  he seems to be weathering the challenges and the army has not moved. Therefore,  considering the strategic consequences is appropriate, and those strategic  consequences appear substantial.

Read more:  Egypt and the Strategic Balance | Stratfor

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Mimicking Breivik in Poland from Stratfor

“<a href=”http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mimicking-breivik-poland”>Mimicking Breivik in Poland </a> is republished with permission of Stratfor.”

By Ben West

Poland’s Internal Security Agency announced Nov. 20 that it had arrested  “Brunon K,” a chemistry professor at the Agricultural University in Krakow who  allegedly planned to attack the lower house of the Polish parliament. The arrest  came Nov. 9, just two days before Warsaw’s annual Independence Day parade, which  authorities believe could have been another target. During the arrest,  authorities seized ammonium nitrate fertilizer, high-powered, military-grade  explosive RDX and other bomb-making equipment. They also seized several  hundred rounds of ammunition, a bulletproof vest and a pistol.

Presumably, the suspect in question is Dr. Brunon Kwiecien, who has published  multiple chemistry papers at the Agricultural University in Krakow, according to  a Polish academic directory. Kwiecien openly espoused anti-government views and  accused the Polish government and the European Commission of tyranny.  Specifically, he condemned the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which has  angered Internet freedom activists in Europe.

Kwiecien is also a self-proclaimed supporter of Norwegian  ultranationalist terrorist Anders Breivik, who conducted a successful lone  wolf attack in Oslo in 2011. Indeed, tactically Kwiecien’s plot against the  Polish government resembled Breivik’s in many ways. But his was only the latest,  certainly not the last, thwarted terrorist attack in Europe, where similar plots  can be expected as the economic and political situation continues to  worsen.

The Plot

Kwiecien allegedly considered Breivik’s  vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack on Norway’s parliament  building a failure — Breivik’s killed  only eight people and failed to inflict catastrophic structural damage on  the building. Breivik used 1 metric ton of ammonium nitrate-based explosives,  commonly called ANFO,  or ammonium nitrate fuel oil, and parked his vehicle on the street,  putting some distance between the VBIED and the building. Kwiecien intended to  construct an explosive device using 4 metric tons of ANFO inside a tanker truck,  crash through the gates of the parliament building and detonate the VBIED within  the courtyard. Investigators believe that it would have been a suicide mission.  Had he executed his attack successfully, he likely would have created a blast  big enough to cause significant structural damage and loss of life, resulting in  more damage and more deaths than Breivik’s explosive device.

According to authorities, Kwiecien began planning for the attack between July  and September. He apparently had traveled to Warsaw to surveil the area  surrounding the building. The fact that there is fairly light security at the  entrance to the parliament building may have encouraged Kwiecien to go forward  with his plot.

What differentiates Kwiecien — and Breivik before him — from many other  aspiring terrorists is his knowledge of how to make bombs. Most grassroots  terrorists lack the requisite  skillset and the wherewithal to build a viable explosive device. Reaching  out for assistance in acquiring these skills exposes them to detection. For  example, Adel Daoud was arrested Sept. 15 in Chicago by an undercover FBI agent,  from whom Daoud had sought assistance to carry out his attack.

Kwiecien’s Skillset

Kwiecien, a professional  chemist, could have avoided Daoud’s fate. He had the scientific background  necessary to know how to make explosives. He also was an explosives enthusiast;  allegedly he lost several of his fingers detonating a homemade bomb when he was  a teenager. He had filmed his “experiments” over the past 10 years. Authorities  also claim that Kwiecien had detonated a bomb containing as much as 250  kilograms (about 550 pounds) of explosives, though video footage shows explosive  charges that were much smaller.

 

Even if he had detonated a bomb of that size, there is no indication that he  ever came close to experimenting with a bomb containing 4 metric tons of  explosives. Thoroughly mixing 4 metric tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and  diesel, the typical fuel oil in ANFO, is very difficult, but the challenge in  constructing bombs that large is detonation. Generally, the larger the main  charge is, the harder it is to achieve a simultaneous detonation and thus cause  maximum damage.

Four metric tons of ANFO equates to more than 3,000 liters (800 gallons).  Successfully igniting all that material requires the ignition of several  smaller, high-powered detonation charges. Otherwise the device can fail or only  partially detonate in what is referred to as a low-order explosion, where the  ANFO is propelled away from the device rather than detonated. In 2010, Faisal  Shahzad attempted to construct a device and detonate it in Times  Square. But he was an amateur bombmaker. As such, he constructed a poorly made  bomb, and the main charge failed to detonate accordingly.

It appears that Kwiecien was planning to use RDX for the detonation charges.  Acquiring ANFO is relatively easy; it is made from legitimate agricultural  products, and Kwiecien worked at an agricultural university. Acquiring RDX  is far more difficult; it’s a military-grade explosive that is much more  regulated than fertilizer. But again, Kwiecien’s chemistry background would have  given him the skills needed to make homemade RDX instead of having to source it  externally. Making it alone would shield him from law enforcement officials who  monitor the acquisition of such materials.

Kwiecien’s Mistakes

It is unclear whether Kwiecien could have built the bomb he intended to, but  he was much more likely to have done so than other would-be terrorists. However,  just because Kwiecien appears to have had the skillset to make a bomb without  alerting the authorities does not mean that he kept the plot only to himself. In  fact, he made several serious mistakes in plotting his attack that made him  vulnerable to authorities.

Kwiecien brazenly advertised his anti-government ideology. He reportedly  spoke openly with his students about bringing down the Polish government. He  taught extracurricular classes on making explosives and claimed that officials  had threatened to prosecute him if he didn’t stop them. His wife, a biologist,  alerted authorities when Kwiecien allegedly asked her how he could make a  biological “dirty bomb.”

In addition, Kwiecien used his own email address and identity for his online  activity, where he made anti-government comments, praised Breivik and openly  recruited like-minded people to join his cause. Reports indicate that Polish  authorities’ investigations into Breivik’s connections in Poland may have also  led to Kwiecien. All of these actions tipped off authorities, who likely had a  fairly thick file on him by the time he was arrested.

Notably, none of his actions were necessarily grounds for prosecution. To  gather more evidence, the Polish national police mounted an investigation that  involved infiltrating his group. Excluding Kwiecien, the group comprised four  members, two of whom were undercover agents. The other two were arrested.

Once undercover, the two operatives were able to collect details on  Kwiecien’s weapons and explosives acquisition efforts. Moreover, they would have  been able to provide evidence that ties Kwiecien to the materials meant to be  used in the attack. The operatives also could have kept tabs on Kwiecien and  alerted authorities when they believed he was moving closer to an attack.

Kwiecien’s motivations for expanding his group are unknown, but ultimately it  was his desire for recruitment that compromised him.

Breivik’s Influence

Like Breivik, Kwiecien embodied the rare combination of ideological fervor  and technical capability. But unlike Breivik, he did not strictly adhere to  operational security standards. Breivik went to great lengths to maintain  operational security, seeking help only when he absolutely needed it — like  when he traveled to purchase firearms. Kwiecien flaunted his capabilities and  his ideology, making him a bigger target for authorities.

Kwiecien was also a copycat who sought to conduct the same attack that  Breivik did, only on a larger scale. European authorities — indeed, law  enforcement agencies around the world — have studied the Breivik case for more  than a year. Thus they probably became better at identifying attacks that employ  the same tactics.

Perhaps most important, Kwiecien’s case also shows that Breivik’s call to  action has been heard. In his manifesto, Breivik appealed to other like-minded  individuals to form cells and fight multiculturalism in Europe. Individuals like  Breivik and Kwiecien, who combine capability and ideology, are rare. But Europe  has a skilled workforce that could produce similarly capable extremists.

Indeed, Breivik and Kwiecien are not alone in their ultranationalist ideals.  On Nov. 23, Swedish extremist Peter Mangs was sentenced to life in prison for a  series of killings targeting immigrants around Malmo, a city in southern Sweden.  Mangs killed for several years before he was caught, indicating that he was well  disciplined and practiced operational security.

The conditions of Europe are conducive for extremism. As national economies  worsen and European institutions weaken, there will be more cause, in the eyes  of extremists, to lash out against the state and against Europe. Such  threats are not found only among ultranationalists. Left-wing groups and anarchist  cells also pose a threat, as evidenced in Greece and  Italy. Kwiecien certainly will not be the last extremist to plot an attack in  Europe, and the more like-minded individuals who take up the cause, the higher  the chances are for more attacks.

Read more:  Mimicking Breivik in Poland | Stratfor

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