Battle of the Chippewa, July, 1814- when Cousin Jonathan finally received some respect

Martin Gibson:

Excellent blog post about the Battle of the Chippewa 200 years ago from Bruce at History Stuff That Interests Me.

Originally posted on History Stuff That Interests Me:

This coming Christmas Eve the United States and Great Britain will be celebrating the end of the War of 1812. It was on December 24th, 1814 that the two powers signed the Treaty of Ghent that ended the conflict.

It is unclear at this point whether President Obama and PM David Cameron intend to mark the occasion with a grand ceremony. I doubt it. In fact, I bet that many Americans or Brits are even aware that 200 years ago the two countries fought a bitter little war that lasted about 30 months.

While barely remembered in Britain and the US the event has been extensively celebrated in Canada who see it as a type of independence day-an independence not from Britain but from the US because the US took the occasion of the war to invade Canada more than once in an attempt to make it part of the…

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Month of Madness – BBC Radio 4

BBC radio has just broadcast a series of five 15 minute episodes about the Month of Madness that led to the First World War. It was presented and written by Professor Christopher Clark, author of The Sleepwalkers, an acclaimed history of the causes of the war.

The programme is available on the BBC i Player from this link. Unlike TV ones, radio programmes appear to remain available indefinitely, and I do not think that there are any geographical restrictions on listening to them.

Episode one, Sarajevo

This covered the impact of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife by Gavrilo Princep, a Bosnian Serb nationalist on 28 June 1914. Franz Ferdinand was a moderate reformer who wanted to turn the Austro-Hungarian Empire into a United States of Greater Austria, consisting of 15 or 16 federal districts, each dominated by a different ethnic group: the Empire had 11 official nationalities. Clark argues that he was assassinated because he was a moderate: extremists fear moderate opponents more than hardliners, because moderates offer the possibility of peaceful change.

The assassination succeeded by luck. An attempt earlier in the day failed, other assassins lost their nerve and Princep got his chance only because Franz Ferdinand’s driver took a wrong turn.

Serbian nationalists wanted to incorporate Bosnia-Herzegovnia into a Greater Serbia because Serbs were the largest of its national groups, although at 43% they were still a minority. Princep and his fellow Bosnian Serb assassins were ‘abstinent’ young men, with little time for alcohol or women. Clark notes that they were the type of ‘sombre’ young men who join terrorist groups today.

The killing of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne by a Serbian nationalist meant that Austria-Hungary would take action against Serbia. However, whether a Balkan conflict became a European war depended on the decisions taken by other countries in the next few weeks.

Episode 2, Vienna

This explores how the Austro-Hungarians reacted to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. There was widespread shock; as with the assassination of JFK, people were able to remember years afterwards where they were when they learnt the news. Emperor Franz Josef did not get on well with his heir, but it is a myth that he received the news coldly. Eye witnesses stated that he was clearly upset.

The assassins were trained and equipped in Serbia, with backing from the Black Hand, a shadowy network whose objectives included the liberation of Bosnian Serbs from Austrian rule. It was headed by Dragutin Dimitrijević, also known as Apis, the head of Serbian Military Intelligence. The civilian Serbian government was unable to act against the members of the Black Hand because they were too well connected.

A consensus emerged quickly in the Austrian Foreign Ministry and General Staff that action must be taken against Serbia. As a minimum a very harsh ultimatum should be sent, but most wanted a war that would settle their issues with Serbia.

Two days after the assassination Count Leopold von Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, told Emperor Franz Josef, that Austria-Hungary could no longer be patient with Serbia. The Emperor agreed. In previous Balkan crises Franz Ferdinand had urged caution, but nobody did so now that he was dead.

Clark says that the ultimatum prepared by Berchtold was a very firm one. He thinks that it can be questioned whether it was really completely unacceptable to a sovereign country, but the Austro-Hungarians certainly intended it to be rejected. They wanted ‘war on a neighbour that they saw as as impossibly turbulent and provocative.’

The Austro-Hungarians concentrated almost all of their attention on Serbia. They had no exit strategy, did not have clear objectives for their action, did not consider the risks involved and were not prepared for the major war that followed. They did realise that they needed support from their ally Germany, since Russia might come to the aid of Serbia.

Episode 3, Berlin.

This discusses Germany’s blank cheque to Austria-Hungary for war against Serbia. Kaiser Wilhelm II got on well with Franz Ferdinand and agreed with him on many issues. Until now, the Germans had been urging the Austro-Hungarians to try to find peaceful solutions to their difficulties with Serbia; this now changed.

On 5 July the Austro-Hungarian ambassador presented letters from Franz Josef and his foreign minister to the Kaiser. The Kaiser and his general staff realised that Austro-Hungarians wanted war with Serbia, and promised to support whatever Austria-Hungary did, the so-called blank cheque. This came without conditions, so Germany was agreeing to support Austria-Hungary even if Russia intervened. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador told his government that the Kaiser thought Austria-Hungary should not delay if it wanted military action against Serbia.

The Germans did not think at this stage that Russia would intervene against Austria-Hungary, but knew that there was a risk that it would. If Germany stood by its ally, Russia’s ally France would join what would then be a continental war. The German Chancellor Theobald von Bethman-Hollweg said that if Germany advised Austria-Hungary to act, it would say that Germany pushed it into war. If Germany urged caution, Austria-Hungary would claim that it had been abandoned and Germany would lose its only reliable ally.

Russian military power was also growing. It and France had one million more soldiers that Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914. Russia had embarked upon a massive rearmament programme, which was financed by France, but it would take time to complete. Germany and Austria-Hungary might win a war now, but not one in three years time.

However, the Germans thought that the Russian would not go to war. Tsar Nicholas II would surely not support regicide, Russia had no formal alliance with Serbia and why would Russia go to war now when it would be much stronger in three years time.

The Germans stuck to a policy of localisation. Nothing should be done that would escalate the crisis. Political and military officials, including the Kaiser went on holiday. When he returned on 27 July, he said that the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian note meant that a war was now unnecessary. He now urged peace, something that did not surprise his critics in the German army, who regarded him as somebody who talked aggressively but would argue for peace in the end.

Clark argues that the failure of the Kaiser’s last minute attempt to prevent a war shows that he was not as powerful as many have claimed. The Germans did not have a plan for continental war, but were willing to risk one, something in which they were not alone.

Episode 4, The French in St Petersburg 

This looks at the dangerous impact of the extension of the Franco-Russian alliance. By chance, Raymond Poincaré, the French President, was on long planned state visit to France’s ally Russia for much of the crisis, arriving on 20 July. The minutes of the summit have been lost, but the meetings can be reconstructed from the notes and diaries of those present, including Count Louis de Robien, a young French diplomat. He was appalled by the bellicose tone of the meetings. On his return to France on 28 July, Poincaré was greeted as if the country was already at war.

The France and Russia had been allied since the early 1890s, but both had urged caution on the other until the beginning of 1912. Poincaré then assured Russia that France would support it if it took action against Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, even if Russia was not itself threatened with attack. The French were becoming concerned that they could not rely on British help, so felt that they had to remain close to Russia. This was a defensive strategy, with the object of never having to fight Germany alone, but it carried serious risks.

Russia had no serious conflicts of interest with Germany, but Austria-Hungary was a long-standing rival of Russia in the Balkans, which were becoming more important in Russian thinking because of their proximity to the Turkish Straits. All sea traffic to and from the Black Sea had to pass through them, including 80% of Russia’s grain exports, a vital source of revenue. Russian nationalists also felt close to other Orthodox and Slavic nations, such as Serbia.

This encouraged Serbian leaders to believe that they could afford to have poor relations with Austria-Hungary, because Russia would support Serbia in a conflict. Clark does not believe that France and Russia wanted or planned a war, but they increased the risk of one by linking their strategy to the uncertain Balkan situation.

During the Franc0-Russian summit Poincaré urged Russia to be firm; Clark says this was ‘enthusiastically received.’ Poincare’s policy of closer relations with Russia ensured that France would not have to fight Germany alone, but made the situation more complex. The French had to assure the Russians of their support, but also had to make certain that the British did not think that France was escalating the crisis.

By the end of July it was difficult to see how a war could be avoided, but the question of whether or not Britain would enter it remained. Both France and Germany acted cautiously, the former hoping that Britain would support it, the latter that Britain would remain neutral. Neither considered backing down or putting peace ahead of prestige. De Robain said that both sides had determined to ‘hold firm…in a tragic poker game.’

Episode 5, London

This explores how British decision-makers reacted in the July Crisis of 1914. Britain was more concerned by the threat of civil war in Ireland, where the Protestant Unionists of the north opposed the government’s intention to grant the Catholic Nationalists of the south demand for Home Rule.

The key player was the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey. Although a Liberal MP, he favoured what Clark calls ‘a secretive, even conspiratorial’ way of operating, believing that foreign policy was too important to be decided by Parliamentary debates. He knew little of foreign countries, spoke no foreign languages and felt uncomfortable in the company of foreigners.

For much of the crisis the British did not consider the possibility that they might be drawn into war. Grey did not raise it in Cabinet until 24 July. Over recent years he had allowed the 1904 Entente Cordiale with France to deepen into something close to a strategic partnership, but the majority of the Cabinet strongly opposed any binding commitment to France, and thus Russia. The French wanted the Entente to be a British commitment to stand by France, but for Grey it had to be a looser agreement that did not bind Britain, which did not know the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance.

On 3 August Grey justified British entry into the war on three grounds: the moral obligations resulting from the Anglo-French friendship, especially the strategic partnership between the two navies; if Germany won, Britain would face a Continent dominated by one power, whilst a Franco-Russian victory would mean a Russian threat to Britain’s Asian empire; and the German breach of Belgian neutrality.

Clark says that the German invasion of Belgium was:

‘a gross offense against international law which endowed the Entente war effort with a lasting sense of moral superiority, but it was not the true reason for British intervention…the decision was made on a cool calculation of national interest.’

However, public anger over the invasion of Belgium helped to win support for the declaration of war.

Clark’s conclusions was that the men who made the decisions ‘were walking in watchful steps’ towards war. There was an ‘intricate structure of..interlocking commitments’, which became mixed up with ‘the volatile politics of a region inflamed by repeated conflict.’ There was an atmosphere of distrust and provocation. No one power was to blame for a war that resulted from ‘a shared European political culture.’

A very interesting a thought provoking programme. Clark does not attempt to blame any one country or alliance for the war. I have just started reading his book, where he says that he is more interested in question of ‘how’ rather than ‘why’ the war began.

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1914: Day by Day: BBC Radio 4

BBC Radio 4 today started broadcasting a series of daily programmes in which the Canadian historian Prof. Margaret MacMillan gives a five minute summary of the news from each day from 27 June 1914 up until the outbreak of the First World War.

Each programme is broadcast at 4:55 pm on BBC Radio 4, and all will be available on the I-Player from this link once they have been broadcast. Radio programmes normally stay on the I-Player indefinitely, and I think that, unlike TV ones, there are no geographical restrictions on listening to them.

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USAF Deploys B52 and B2 Strategic Bombers to UK

Three USAF B52s and two B2 bombers have been deployed to RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire in the United Kingdom. Fairford is currently a standby airfield, with no aircraft permanently assigned to it, and is the only US airbase in Europe capable of operating strategic bombers. Its facilities include a long runway with an unrestricted load bearing capacity and two climate controlled hangars specially designed to take B2s.

This has been described as being a long planned training exercise, but it is difficult to see the first deployment of these aircraft in Europe since the 2003 Iraq War as being unrelated to the rising tension between Russia and the West over Ukraine. The B2s that bombed Libyan airfield in 2011 as part of the enforcement of the UN no-fly zone flew from the USA, with the help of in-flight tankers.

This BBC article includes a video from a reporter on board a B52.

Fairford was one of a global network of Trans-Oceanic Abort Landing sites for the Space Shuttle in friendly countries, which would have been used had a fault with a Shuttle prevented it returning to its US base. None of them were ever needed.

The Royal International Air Tattoo, one of the largest airshows in the world, is held annually at Fairford, with this year’s show on 11-13 July. As the US bombers are to stay at Fairford for a month, it will be interesting to see if they participate in it.

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Normandy 44: The Battle Beyond D-Day

Many programmes about D-Day, or Operation Overlord, have been broadcast recently because of the 70th anniversary. One that took a slightly different approach was a BBC documentary introduced by James Holland called Normandy ’44: The Battle Beyond D-Day, which told the story of the entire Normandy campaign rather than just the events of 6 June 1944. Holland argued that ‘the Americans were not so dominant, the Germans so skilful or the British so hapless’ as is commonly believed.

Holland argued that the story is usually told from ”a predominantly American perspective, with the British effort often relegated to little more than an amateurish sideshow.’ He noted that there are three levels to warfare: strategy, the overall goals of the leaders; tactics, the actual fighting; and operational, the nuts and bolts, the logistical link between the first two. The third is often ignored.

His programme featured interviews with British veteran tank commander David Render of the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, German veteran Johannes Werner, several historians, including Stephen Prince of the British Naval Historical Branch, Professor John Buckley of Wolverhampton University and Peter Caddick-Adams of Cranfield University and weapons experts. There were also readings from the diary of Stanley Christopherson, another Sherwood Rangers tank commander, and two German generals, Fritz Bayerlein, commander of the Panzer Lehr Division, and Sepp Dietrich, commander of the X SS Panzer Korps. Christopherson’s son David also took part.

Sea control stretching across the world was required to bring all the necessary supplies to France, as well as 2 million men from North America, 1.5 million from the USA and 0.5  million from Canada.

The Germans had 58 divisions in France on 6 June, but only six were Panzer or Panzer Grenadiers. The others were largely static infantry divisions, dependent on horse power. They had to be overcome on 6 June before the armour and mechanised infantry could reach the beaches.

The beaches were defended by MG34 or MG42 dual purpose machine guns in concrete bunkers. These had a much higher rate of fire than a British Bren light machine gun. This gave them a very distinctive sound. However, an MG34 took 115 man hours to manufacture and an MG42 75 hours, compared with 50 for a Bren.

The German machine gun’s high rate of fire meant that their barrels had to be changed frequently. The bunkers were sited on forward slopes, meaning that the Germans could not evacuate wounded or bring reinforcements or more ammunition forward once the fighting had begun. Very heavy casualties were inflicted by the German machine guns on the early waves of US troops landing on Omaha Beach, but the Germans fire died down as they suffered casualties, ran short of ammo and their guns over heated.

Panzer divisions moving to the invasion beaches were attacked continually from the air. Bayerlein reported that his division took two days and a nights to reach Caen. On 7 June it lost 85 or 86 armoured vehicles, 123 trucks, 5 tanks and 23 half tracks through air attacks.

Holland argued that, despite personality clashes,  the Allied command structure under General Dwight Eisenhower ‘was more efficiently structured’ than the German one. He also contended that the abilities of General Sir Bernard Montgomery, at this stage in command of all Allied land forces in Normandy, have been obscured by his tendency to annoy people.

The plan for Overlord was largely devised by Montgomery. He stressed the need to quickly form a continuous bridgehead and to capture Cherbourg and the high ground to the south and south east of Caen. It was a major junction of roads, railways and a river. He intended that the bulk of the German panzers should be drawn into the British and Canadians on the eastern flank, allowing the Americans in the west freedom to manoeuvre south.

Caen is the major query over Montgomery’s plan. It was supposed to be taken on 6 June, with the Allies reaching Paris within 90 days. This required a single British division to move 10 miles inland from Sword Beach on D-Day itself. Intelligence showed that German forces in the area had been reinforced in May, but a lack of landing craft meant that it was not possible to increase the British force heading for Caen.

Something that Montgomery did get right was the need to build up forces as fast as possible. The Allies did not control a port in Normandy, so they took their their own, the Mulberry Harbours. At their peak, they landed 7,000 tons a day. However, everything had to be ferried ashore by landing craft on D-Day, meaning that the men heading for Caen were lightly equipped. They were held up for a day a bunker complex, named Hillman by the Allies, which covered the Caen road and could not be by passed.

The German Tiger tank was feared by the Allies. It was a formidable opponent, but it used 5 litres of fuel per kilometre, compared with 2 for the American built Sherman, the most common Allied tank in Normandy. The Germans were short of fuel, the Allies were not. Additionally, the Tiger’s complex transmission system was vulnerable to breakdowns.

The German 88mm gun, fitted to the Tiger, fired its shells at a fearsome velocity, but so did the British 17 pounder, fitted to some Shermans, termed Fireflies. This made the normally undergunned Sherman a threat to the Tiger. However, Tigers could wreak havoc, as at Villars Bocage on 12 June, where the SS tank ace Michael Wittmann massacred a British column.

David Render, a British tank officer in Normandy, said that the Allies had a more team based approach. Troops of tanks would work together, with the destruction of an enemy tank being attributed to the troop rather than to an individual commander as was the case with the Germans.

Villars Bocage was of little strategic significance in itself, and it cost the Germans several Tigers, fighting in an urban area without infantry support. However, it signalled the start of a lengthy battle of attrition for Caen. Wittman and his crew were killed by a Sherman Firefly later in the Normandy campaign.

At the same time the Americans were being held up by difficult terrain of the bocage, small fields surrounded by high hedgerow. Shermans could not get through the hedges to support the infantry. If they tried to go over them, they would expose their poorly armoured undersides.

The problem was solved by the ingenuity of Curtis Culin, a US National Guardsman who had worked in a garage before the war. He came up with a hedge cutter that could be fitted to a Sherman. It was made from German beach obstacles and did not require great skill on the part of the welders, meaning that it could be manufactured quickly in the field. Culin’s prototype was ready to be demonstrated in a week, and 60% of US Shermans were fitted with his hedge cutters a fortnight later. He was awarded the Legion of Merit and survived the war, but lost a leg in the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest.

Culin’s invention and its quick adoption showed the combination of ingenuity and fast moving flexibility that gave the Americans an advantage at the operational level.

The Germans concentrated large numbers of tanks near Caen. The British had advanced less than 10 miles from their beaches.  This looked unimpressive on the map, but gave them a major logistical advantage. The battles around Caen are usually portrayed as the British battering their heads against a brick wall, but Holland argued that it was the other way round. The Germans had a reputation for tactical excellence, but they could always be relied upon to counter attack. The Allies had only to probe forward, wait for the German counter attack and destroy it with their superior firepower.

Allied units, unlike German ones, could be resupplied and kept up to strength. The Sherwood Rangers were part of a brigade of three regiments each with 50 tanks. It received 1,073 new tanks during the campaign in order to keep 150 in the field. The Germans built only 1,500 Tigers during the war. David Render came out of three tanks in the campaign. Stanley Christopherson used five in a day in the desert campaign.

Stephen Prince argued that the Allied system built up and sustained larger numbers throughout the campaign. They had complete air superiority. The millionth Allied soldier arrived in Normandy on 12 July. The Germans started strong, but had to solve crises by taking troops from support functions. This worked for a while, keeping the Allies closer to the beach than they had intended. However, by late July the Allies had built up their forces and were able to break through the Germans, who could no longer stop them.

A major British offensive, Operation Goodwood, was launched on 18 July with huge air, naval and artillery support. It was to be followed by an American attack at St Lo. However, it advanced only seven miles, one for every 1,000 tons of bombs dropped. Montgomery had claimed that it would be a massive killer blow in order to get the air power that he wanted. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Eisenhower’s deputy, tried to get Montgomery sacked.

Holland argued that Montgomery was good at speaking to troops and the press, but bad at dealing with his peers and superiors. Goodwood would not have been so controversial had he explained his plan properly. 400 British tanks  were knocked out in Goodwood, but 300 of them were repaired and back in action in days. Montgomery was focussed only on Normandy, but Eisenhower had to look at a bigger picture, including the need to capture V1 launch sites and the greater progress being made by the Red Army on the Eastern Front.

The Americans launched Operation Cobra, the follow up to Goodwood, on 25 July. The Germans, over-stretched at Caen, were unable to resist the US offensive and were forced to retreat. A counter attack with all remaining German reserves was launched on 7 August. It failed and the Germans were forced back to Falaise. There were so many corpses that Werner had to walk on them. On 12 June he was part of a company of 120 men. Nine of them survived the campaign.

Allied casualties averaged 6,500 killed, wounded and captured on each of the 77 days of the Normandy campaign. Peter Caddick-Adams argued that in that time the Allied armies underwent a learning process the equivalent of which had taken four years in the First World War.

The campaign did not go to the initial plan, because the Germans tried to hold the Allies closer to the beaches than they had expected. However, the Allies moved very quickly once they had broken out of Normandy. They had planned to take Paris after 90 days, but were actually in Brussels 90 days after D-Day.

 

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BBC Coverage of D-Day 70th Anniversary

I was going to write a longer blog post on the 70th anniversary of D-Day, but I have been so impressed with the BBC coverage that I have instead posted a series of links to its website.

Throughout 6 June 2014, the BBC has shown live coverage of the events being held to commemorate the 70th anniversary of D-Day on BBC News 24, its 24 hour news channel, including many interviews with veterans. It has also broadcast significant coverage on BBC1, its main channel.

This is the main page from the BBC website’s coverage. The  TV programmes on the I-Player are generally not available outside the UK, but I think that the videos on this link will work globally.

Other articles on the BBC’s website include:

D:Day in the words of BBC journalists at the time.

A story about an 89 year old veteran who was reported missing by the care home that he lives in. He had gone to Normandy. The head of the local police tweeted that:

“Love this: 89yr old veteran reported missing by care home who said he can’t go to Normandy for #DDay70 remembrance. We’ve found him there!”

The coverage obviously concentrated on British veterans, but it made it clear that people from many countries participated.

Coverage from other British media outlets include:

The Guardian (left wing quality newspaper).

Daily Telegraph (right wing quality newspaper: there is a restriction on the number of articles you can read per month).

Sky News (the other UK 24 hours news channel, owned by Rupert Murdoch).

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The Capture of the USS Essex 28 March 1814.

The USS Essex, Captain David Porter, sailed from the Delaware on 28 October 1812 with orders to rendezvous with the USS Constitution and Hornet under Commodore Bainbridge.

Porter believed his ship to be ‘the worst frigate’ in the United States Navy.[1] He disliked her armament, which consisted largely of carronades, very powerful but short range guns.

The Essex missed a number of rendezvous with Bainbridge before capturing the Post Office Packet Nocton on 12 December. Porter removed £15,000 worth of specie and sent her back to the USA as a prize, but she was recaptured on the way. On 29 December he took another British merchant ship.

Before the war Porter had proposed that the USN send an expedition to explore and colonise the Pacific. No action was taken, but his planning for it meant that he was well informed about the Pacific.

The Spanish colonies on the Pacific coast of South America had revolted, so might be friendly to a US warship. The Royal Navy had no warships in the region, making the British whaling industry and Britain’s substantial trade in the region, which included shipments of specie and bullion to the UK, vulnerable. He therefore decided to use a section of his orders that gave him discretion to act ‘for the good of the service’ to move to the Pacific.[2]

The RN’s Brazil Station, responsible for protecting British maritime trade from the Caribbean to Chile, was commanded by Rear Admiral Manley Dixon. His most important task was to ensure that the bullion and specie needed to finance the war in Europe was transported safely home from South America. By July 1813 he had one 74 gun ship of the line, eight frigates, three sloops and two cutters to protect a vast area from Bainbridge, Porter and a number of privateers.

Dixon’s force was even weaker than the numbers suggest, since one of his frigates was old and three were sixth rates, too small to fight the larger US frigates. He therefore relied on what Andrew Lambert calls ‘widely deployed, effective British intelligence-gathering assets: with consuls, merchants, ship masters and warships in several key locations the information flow was relatively rapid.’[3]

The Essex took 13 prizes in 1813 and inflicted heavy damage on the British whaling fleet. There were no US bases in the Pacific, so for 17 months she was forced to supply herself entirely from prizes . Anything bought had to be paid for by money obtained from the prizes. Theodore Roosevelt describes this feat as being ‘unprecedented.’[4]

Porter valued his captures at $5,000,000: the exchange rate was then £1=$4.40.[5] However, the only one of them that got back to the USA was the Atlantic, which Porter renamed the Essex Junior and armed with 10 long six pounders and 10 18 pound carronades. This made her a useful commerce raider, but she would be helpless against a British frigate.

On 12 January the Essex and the Essex Junior anchored at Valparaiso. On 8 February the 38 gun frigate HMS Phoebe, Captain James Hillyar, and the 18 gun sloop HMS Cherub, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, arrived at Valparaiso.

Roosevelt suggests that the British hoped to take the Americans by surprise, but failed to do so because the Essex was ready for action by the time that Phoebe came alongside her.[6] Lambert argues that they hoped to provoke the Americans into firing first in what was a neutral port.[7]

There then followed a stand-off. Both sides raised provocative banners. The Americans claimed to be fighting for free trade, although their seaman were more likely to be fighting for their ship and shipmates. A British banner referring to traitors would only make the British born members of the US crew fight harder.

Hillyar and Porter had met before when both were serving in the Mediterranean. They had a meeting onshore, at which they agreed to release prisoners, with the proviso that the men involved would not serve in the forthcoming action.

After resupplying his ships Hillyar took them to sea on 14 February. He may have been concerned that the local authorities would prevent the British from sailing for 24 hours if the Americans left the neutral port first.

On 27 February Phoebe fired a gun accidentally. The US officers, including Porter’s 12 year old foster son Midshipman David Farragut, the future Civil War Admiral, thought that this was a challenge. The two US ships set sail, but the British withdrew, refusing to fight a close action.

By the end of March Porter had learnt that two more British frigates were on the way. On the night of 27-28 March the Essex left Valparaiso. An attempt to distract the British by sending out a boat to fire rockets and burn lights failed. The Essex was then hit by a heavy squall, which swept away its main topmast. This cost two of her seamen their lives and made it impossible for her to outrun her pursuers.

At 4 pm the Essex anchored just off the coast.[8] Hillyar argued that she was not in neutral waters because she was out of range of Chilean shore batteries.

Phoebe had a crew of 320 men and a broadside of 13 long 18 pounders, one long 12 pounder, one long 9 pounder, seven 32 pound carronades and one 18 pound carronade, a weight of 255 pounds at long range and 497 pounds at short range.[9]

Cherub had a crew of 180 and a broadside of two long 9 pounders, two 18 pound carronades and nine 32 pound carronades, a weight of 18 pounds at long range and 342 pounds at long range. This made the total weight of the British broadside 273 pounds at long range and 839 pounds at short range.

The Essex had a crew of 255 and a broadside of six long 12 pounders and 17 32 pound carronades, a weight of 66 pounds at long range and 570 pounds at short range if Theodore Roosevelt’s belief that US shot was 7 per cent lighter than its stated size is accepted.[10]

The Essex was outgunned even inside carronade range, even if Roosevelt’s theory about the weight of US shot is rejected, and hopelessly so at longer range. The British also had the tactical advantage of having two ships against one, enabling them to manoeuvre for a better position and keep one ship out of the Essex’s arc of fire.

Hillyar closed to 250 yards before opening fire at 4:20 pm. He initially placed Cherub on the Essex’s starboard bow and Phoebe under her stern, meaning that the US ship could not fire on Phoebe. Three attempts were made to put springs on the Essex cables in order to move her into a position where she could fire, but the springs were shot away. Cherub came under fire from the US bow guns, so moved close to Phoebe. Tucker was wounded but remained at his post.

In the first five minutes of the action the Americans suffered heavy casualties without being able to damage Phoebe, but then moved three 12 pounders to fire from the Essex’s stern, with the intention of crippling Phoebe’s rigging.

At 4:40 pm Hillyar ceased fire and withdrew. After repairing the damage to Phoebe’s rigging the British resumed the attack at 5:35 pm. Hillyar positioned his ship on the Essex’s starboard quarter, where the US broadside and stern guns could not bear. He stayed about half a mile away from his opponent, close enough for the British 18 long pounders to inflict significant damage, but too long a range for the American carronades to be effective.

Porter cut his ship’s cables at 5:50 pm and set all her remaining sails, his intention being to board Phoebe. This was a desperate move because the damage to the Essex’s rigging made her far less manoeuvrable than Phoebe. What little chance it had of success was ended when the wind died away.

Porter, with no hope of victory, now tried to run his ship aground and blow her up, but he was again thwarted by a change in the wind. With many of his crew badly wounded he now had no choice to surrender, but first encouraged the able bodied to abandon ship and head for the shore. The Essex’s flag was lowered at 6:20 pm by Hillyar’s account.

Total US casualties were 58 killed on board, 31 drowned whilst trying to reach the shore, 66 wounded and 76 captured unwounded, with 24 of the 255 crew making it to the shore. Phoebe lost four killed and seven wounded and Cherub one killed and three wounded. Porter offered Hillyar his sword, as was the custom of the day, but Hillyar allowed him to keep it.

Essex Junior, which had played no part in the battle, was also captured by the British. She was disarmed and sent to New York with exchanged US prisoners, including Porter. The Essex was taken into the RN, but was used mostly as a prison ship.

Hillyar reached the rank of Admiral and commanded fleets at sea in peacetime: the RN had far more officers than peacetime jobs for them, so this showed that he was well regarded.

Porter was treated as a hero on his return to the US. He was later court-martialled for exceeding his orders whilst suppressing piracy in the West Indies, commanded the Mexican Navy and became US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire

As with almost all naval actions of the War of 1812 the Battle of Valparaiso was won by the more powerful force. Hillyar acted cautiously, but his duty was to take the Essex with the minimum casualties and damage to his ships, which he achieved.

 

[1] A. T. Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, 2 vols. (London: Samson Low, Marston, 1905). vol ii. p. 1.

[2] Quoted in A. D. Lambert, The Challenge: Britain against America in the Naval War of 1812 (London: Faber, 2012). Kindle edition, locations 5365-68.

[3] Ibid. Kindle locations 5401-6.

[4] T. Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812, 2 vols. (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1900-2), p. 201.

[5] Lambert, The Challenge. Kindle locations 5483-87.

[6] Roosevelt, Naval War. vol. ii p. 10.

[7] Lambert, The Challenge. Kindle locations 5536-40.

[8] Times quoted are from the British account. The Americans clock was 25 minutes earlier.Ibid. Kindle location 5630-71.

[9] Crews and armaments are from Roosevelt, Naval War. vol. ii, p. 30

[10] Ibid. vol. i, pp. 82-83.

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